Parental Rights in Indiana

Indiana Parental Rights News

Calls Needed to Advance Parental Rights Bill in Indiana

February 9, 2023

On January 17, Representative Dale DeVon introduced HB1407, an act to amend the Indiana Code concerning family law and juvenile law. The bill guarantees “the right of a parent to direct the upbringing, education, health care, and mental health of the parent’s child” and prohibits the state or any agency or subdivision of the state…

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Indiana State Law and Parental Rights

Protected!

We did it! Thanks in part to your support, as of April 22, 2025, parental rights are protected as a fundamental right in the Indiana Parents' Bill of Rights. This law provides (in part):

SB 143 A governmental entity may not substantially burden certain parental rights unless the burden is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering the governmental interest. Prohibits a governmental
entity from: (1) advising, directing, or coercing a child to withhold certain information from the child's parent; or (2) denying a child's parent access to certain information. Allows a parent to bring an action against a governmental entity for certain violations and provides for certain relief.

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Indiana Courts and Parental Rights

At Risk

Indiana court decisions over the past decade have been centered on principles set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court in Troxel v. Granville. The confused legacy of Troxel affords some deference to the rights of parents without guaranteeing their protection under the strict scrutiny standard.

  • Crafton v. Gibson, 752 N.E.2d 78, 92 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) affirmed an earlier decision which used the flimsy "rational basis " scrutiny to evaluate a grandparent visitation statute because "the Supreme Court in Troxel did not articulate what standard would be applied in determining whether nonparental visitation statutes violate the fundamental rights of parents."
  • In McCune v. Frey, 783 N.E.2d 752, 757–59 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), the Indiana Court of Appeals soon distilled the Troxel plurality’s principles into four factors that a grandparent-visitation order “should address”:(1) a presumption that a fit parent’s decision about grandparent visitation is in the child’s best interests (thus placing the burden of proof on the petitioning grandparents);(2) the “special weight” that must therefore be given to a fit parent’s decision regarding nonparental visitation (thus establishing a heightened standard of proof by which a grandparent must rebut the presumption);(3) “some weight” given to whether a parent has agreed to some visitation or denied it entirely (since a denial means the very existence of a child-grandparent relationship is at stake, while the question otherwise is merely how much visitation is appropriate); and(4) whether the petitioning grandparent has established that visitation is in the child’s best interests.
  • Re K.I, 903 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind.2009) made consideration of these principles mandatory.
  • Re K.I, 903 N.E.2d 453, 462 (Ind.2009): The parent comes to the table with a "strong presumption that a child's interests are best served by placement with the natural parent." The burden of proof is always on the third party to prove by clear and convincing evidence "that the child's best interests are substantially and significantly served by placement with another person." [Court citing B.H., 770 N.E.2d at 287 (Ind. 2002)]
  • In Re Visitation of M.L.B, 983 N.E.2d 583 (Ind. 2013)the Indiana Supreme Court found that the trial court failed to make any express findings on the first two factors set forth in McCune, namely the presumption of parental fitness and the “special weight” due to fit parents’ decisions.  These factors are “key to a constitutionally appropriate balance between a natural parent’s fundamental rights and a child’s best interests — and without findings reflecting that balance, a grandparent-visitation order is not constitutionally permissible.” Thus, “despite the trial court’s ample ‘best interests’ findings, the lack of findings on the other three factors, both standing alone and as compounded by the extensive visitation awarded without those necessary findings, violates Mother’s fundamental right to direct M.L.B.’s upbringing.”